We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioral structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a population with a fixed number of players.
values. This model was able to achieve this by simply defining the dynamics of two strategies with four outcomes. Suppose that players must choose between options or strategies. In a simple case, player one and player two simultaneously reveal a penny. If both pennies show heads or both show tails, player two must pay player one $1. On the other hand, if one penny shows heads and the other shows tails, player one must pay player two $1. The game, then, can be described as follows; 2 1 (−1, 1) (1, −1) (1, −1) (−1, 1)
The matrix describes, in the ith row and jth column, the pair ( , ) of payoff values. It shows that if the outcome is (-1, 1), player one, who here chooses the row of the payoff matrix, would have done better to choose the other row. On the other hand, if the outcome had been (1, -1), it is player two, the column player, who would have done better to switch. Players one and two have diametrically opposed interests here. This is a very common strategic situation in games. During a game of soccer, in a penalty kick, if the striker and keeper are mismatched, then the striker is happy, but if they are matched, the keeper is happy. This logic applies to many common preference situations, and an efficient way to represent these dynamics is to let a player decide to implement a strategy with a given probability.
= ( 1 , 2 , … , ), 1 ≥ 0 1 + ⋯ + = 1
Where the probability distribution presents two or more pure strategies, among which players choose randomly, denoted as the set of all probability distributions of such mixed strategies, in this way;
( 1 ) + ( 2 ) + ⋯ + ( ) = 1 = 100% ( ) ∈ [0, 1] For all events, the player expects to be happy half of the time and unhappy half of the time.
2 1 (.5) (.5) (.5) (−1, 1) (1, −1) (.5) (1, −1) (−1, 1)
It does not matter what the players do because they cannot change the outcome, so they are just as happy to flip a coin (in the coin game) or choose one direction of two (in soccer). The only question is whether one is able to anticipate the decision of the other player. If striker knows that keeper is playing heads (one direction of two), the striker will avoid heads and play tails (the other direction of the two). However, we cannot usually guess the coin flipping if we change the the payoff to provide a different outcomes. As a matter of facts, if the game expands to the following arbitrarily mixed payoff conditions { > > }, 2 1 ℎ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
A player's expected utility is as follows:
Even in the slightly different payoff related to arbitrarily given mixed-conditions { > > }, the payoff will always be positive for [0,1] in the above conditions. Now, with this dynamic, if we determine the probability that each outcome occurs for some percentage of instances, the payoff of players one and two appear below:
The probability of each outcome must be multiplied by a particular player's payoff. Then, all those numbers are summed together, giving player one's payoff as follows:
2 3 = 6 9 = 2 9 + 0 + 0 + 4 9 = 1 ( 2 9 ) + 0 ( 1 9 ) + 0 ( 4 9 ) + 2 ( 2 9 )
Player one's earned mixed-equilibrium is {2/3}. Then, player two's payoff is as follows:
2 3 = 6 9 = 4 9 + 0 + 0 + 2 9 = 2 ( 2 9 ) + 0 ( 1 9 ) + 0 ( 4 9 ) + 1 ( 2 9 )
This means that player two's earned mixed-equilibrium is also {2/3}. Checking for the underlying assumption of this game's probability distribution ( ) ∈ [0,1], it is clear that all of these payoffs will always be positive for [0,1] because they all must added in the following way:
These also satisfy the rules of probability distributions:
( 1 ) + ( 2 ) + ⋯ + ( ) = 1 = 100%
This relative welfare distribution derived directly from two by two games will allow us to set a fundamental assumption for evolutionary dynamics.
Replicator dynamics:
Now, let the model consider a population of players, each with a given strategy. From time to time, the players meet randomly and play the game according to a plan. If we suppose that each player is rational, individuals consider several types of different payoffs for each:
Where each palyer has the payoff { ( )}, which shows how well that type ( ) is doing, and each type has a proportion {Pr(i)}. Then, they choose a certain strategy they consider to be the best outcome from the entire population.
Where ( ) is the proportion of the different types, and ( ) is the payoff for all of the types.
Here, we consider a population of types, where those populations are succeeding at various levels. Some are doing well, and some are not. The dynamics of the model suppose a series of change in distribution across types, such that there are set of types {1,2, …, N}, a payoff for each type ( ), with a proportion of each as well ( ). The individual player's a strategy (̇) in each round is given a probability that is the ratio of this weighting to the all possible strategies, where, ̇ is the probability that an individual play will take a strategy times payoff [ ( ) ( )], divided the sum of the weightings of all the different strategies [∑ ( ) ( ) =1 ].
Thus, the probability that the individual player will act in a certain way in the next round is just that action's relative weighting. Specifically, let's propose that there are different probabilities ( ) of using different strategies ( , , ) : that is, strategy has a probability of 40%, strategy also has a probability of 40%, and strategy has a 20% probability. That might lead us to guess the strategy and are better than . However, we could also look at the payoffs ( ) of the different strategies. For instance, it might be that using strategy , we can obtain a payoff 5, using strategy there is a payoff 4, and using strategy , players take payoff 6. This prompts us to consider what strategy we should use, and the answer depends on both the payoff and the probability.
In this dynamic, the model presented here proposes a description of how individuals might choose what to do or which strategies are best. Because after certain move, some will appear to be doing better than others, the ones doing worst are likely to copy the ones doing better. Based on the cultural evolutionary assumptions for public goods game, we specified the respective frequencies of actions of cooperators ( ), defectors ( ), and loners ( ). The experimenter assigns a value to each players; then, the players may contribute part (or all) of their value to the game (a common pool).
Cooperators, ready to join to the group and to contirbute to its effort n.a. Defectors, who join but do not contribute n.a. Loner, unwilling to join the public goods game n.a. In each round, a sample ( ) of individuals are chosen randomly from the entire population N. S (0 ≤ ≤ ) out of the individuals participate in the game, paying a cost ( ). Each round requires at least two (cooperator and defector) participants, and others must be nonparticipants. The cooperators contribute a fixed amount of value > 0 and share the outcomes multiplied by the interest rate (1 > > ) equally among all others − 1 participants, defectors are in the round but do not contribute values. During the round, the payoffs for the strategies , , and (denoted by , , ) are then determined, with a participation cost and an interest rate , based on the relative frequencies of the strategies ( / ).
Where is the payoff of the cooperators, is the payoff of the defectors, is the interest rate ( ) multiplied by fixed contribution cost ( ) for the common good. For the expected payoff values of the cooperators ( ) and defectors ( ), a defector in a group with − 1 coplayers ( = 2, … , ) obtains from the common good a payoff of /(1 − ) on average because the nonparticipants ( ) have a payoff of 0 (Sasaki et al., 2012) .
Where, −1 is the probability of finding no coplayer. In the abstract, we can write this as the derivative of with respect to for any power , ( −1) . This is known as the power rule and is symbolically represented as the exponent (i.e., 2 = 2 1 , 3 = 3 2 , … , = −1 ). This is what it means for the derivative of to be −1 and for the population thus to be reduced to loners (nonparticipation). In addition, cooperators contribute effort with a probability 1 − −1 . Hence,
The average payoff ( ̅ ) in the population is then given in this way:
The replicator equation gives the evolution of the three strategies in the population:
The frequencies of the strategies can simply be represented by
̇= ( − ̅ )
Where denotes the frequency of strategy , is the payoff of strategy , and ̅ represents the average payoff in the population. Accordingly, a strategy will spread or dwindle depending on whether it does better or worse than average. This equation holds that populations can evolve, in the sense that the frequencies of strategies change with time. Thus, we let the state ( ) depend on time and denote this by ̇( ), where ̇ changes / . This model is particularly interested in the growth rates of the relative frequencies of the strategies. In other words, the state of the population evolves according to the replicator equation, where the growth rate (̇/ ) of a strategy's frequency corresponds to the difference between its payoff ( ) and the average payoff ( ̅ ) in the population.
Imitation dynamics with updating algorithm:
In the cultural evolutionary context we are considering here, strategies are unlikely to be inherited, but they can be transmitted through social learning (Avital, & Jablonka, 1994 ). If we assume that individuals imitate each other, replicator dynamics will be yielded again. To be more specific, from time to time, a randomly chosen individual from the population imitates a given model with a certain likelihood. Thus, the probability that an individual switchs from one strategy to the other is given as
This is simply the replicator equation, but it describes that a player ( ) making a comparison with another ( ) player will adopt the other's strategy only if it promises a higher payoff. This switch is more likely if the difference in payoff is a function of the frequencies of all strategies, based on pairwise interactions ): The focal individual compares its payoff ( = ) with the payoff of the role individual ( = ), and then the focal individual chooses to imitate (or not) the role individual given the following:
This mechanism holds the factorial for payoff, that is, how many combinations of objects can we take from objects:
with the Gillespie algorithm (stochastic dynamic) for updating the system ( −1 / < 1 < / ). The above procedures assume a well-mixed population with a finite number of strategies that are proportional to its relative abundances given that the fitness values are frequency-dependent, coexisting in steady or fluctuating frequencies the evolutionary games (Figure 2.1) . The mechanism is a combination of the rational process and the copying process, or in order words, an individual rationally chooses from a nearby individual because it seems that it would affect successful outcomes. Replicator-mutator dynamics: Not all learning is learning from others. We can also learn from our own experience. The dynamics of the replicator equation describes selection only, not drift or mutation. An intelligent player might adopt a strategy, even if no one else in the population is using it, if the strategy offers the highest payoff. Dynamics can also be modified with the addition of a small, steady rate of miscopying for any small linear contribution that exceeds the role of dynamics. As a result, the stability of the system changes, making the system structurally unstable. This can be interpreted as the exploration rate, and it corresponds to the mutation term in genetics (Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen, & Hauert, 2010) . Thus, by adding a mutation rate with a frequency-dependent selection, we expect that the impact of mutations can show a more general approach to evolutionary games, without explicit modelling of their origin (Nowak & Sigmund, 2004 ).
= ( − ̅ ) + (1 − ) − 2
In the set of model, both of those dynamics are in play, where individuals are both copying more prominent strategies and copying strategies that are doing better than the others. The fate of an additional strategy can be examined by considering the replicator dynamics in the augmented space (mutation) and computing the growth rate of the fitness that such types get in the case of evolution ( Figure 3 ). The mechanism holds in the ordinary differential equation, namely, a differential equation containing one or more function s of an independent variable and its derivatives: , Replicator-mutator including network dynamics: Current models currently proposed cannot explain cooperation in communists with different average numbers of social ties. To impose the social ties as a parameter, the primary feature of a random graph (Erdos & Rényi, 1959) was used for network characteristics, as follows;
First, individuals in the model considered as vertices (fundamental element drawn as a node), and sets of two elements are drawn as a line connecting two vertices (where lines are called edges) (Figure 4.1's left-hand side) . Nodes are graph elements that store data, and edges are the connections between them, but the edges can store data as well. The edges between the nodes can describe any connection between individuals (called adjacency). The nodes can contain any amount of data with the information we decide to store in this application, and the edges include data on the strength of connections.
Networks have additional properties, in that edges can have a direction, meaning the relationship between two nodes only applies only in one direction, not the other. A directed network is the term for a network where shows a direction. In the present model, however, we used an undirected network, featuring edges with no sense of direction because with a network of individuals and edges that indicate two individuals who have met, directed edges might be unnecessary. Another essential property of this structure is connectivity. A disconnected network has some vertex (nodes) that cannot be reached the other vertices ( Figure 4 .1's right-hand side). A disconnected network might feature one vertex that is off to the side has no edges. It could also have two so-called connected components, which from a connected network on their own but have no connection between them. Thus, a connected network has no disconnected vertices. This could be a criterion for describing a network as a whole, called connectivity. The fulfillment of the criterion would depend on the information contained in the graph, usually controlled by (n, p).
Nodes (vertices) Lines (edges) Disconnected Connected
An object-oriented language was used to allow the creation of vertex and edge objects and
give each of them a property. A vertex could by identified by the list of edges that it is connected to, and the reverse would be true for edges. However, operations involving networks might be inconvenient if we must search through vertex and edge objects. Thus, we represent connections in networks that simply used a list of edges ( In this array, each space is used to store a list of nodes, such that the node with a given ID is adjacent to the index with the same number. For instance, an opening at index 0 represents a vertex with an ID of 0. That vertex shares an edge with one node, so that reference to that node is stored in the first spot in the array. Thus, because the list contains other lists, the adjacency list is two dimensional allowing us to use an adjacency matrix that is essentially a two-dimensional array, but the lists within it are all the same length.
Application (social ties):
Due to the collection of nodes influenced by connection probabilities corresponding to the adjacency list, the distribution of the connection in the network was used for the social ties (probability of degree) as below:
In this context, one might wonder whether some groups of individuals interact with each other more and more often than with others and under which conditions social beings are willing to be cooperative. Moreover, they must be able to adjust their own changes to thrive. To understand a cooperative network of interaction, both the evolution of the network and the evolution of strategies within it should be considered simultaneously.
Where represent the social ties [ = 2| ( )|] between individuals, and is the nodes (Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006) of the sample of the population. (2 − )/ denotes the actual connection in the network ( ), ( − 1)/2 denotes the potential connection in the network ( ). A potential connection ( = ( − 1)/2) is a connection that could potentially exist between two individuals, regardless of whether or not it actually does. One individual could know another individual, and this object could connect to that one.
Whether the connection is actually there is irrelevant when we are talking about a potential connection. By contrast, an actual connection ( = (2 * )/ ) is one that actually exists ( =social ties), where this individual does know that one, and this obejct is connected to that one.
In relation to these small linear contributions and their dynamics, structural instability can be interpreted as the characteristics of the network, influenced by the exploration rate, which corresponds to the idea of mutation in genetics.
Grouping the network characteristics that incorporate the decisions of individuals through establishing new links or giving up existing links (Traulsen, Hauert, De Silva, Nowak, & Sigmund, 2009 ), we propose a version of evolutionary game theory and study the dynamical coevolution of individual strategies and network structure. In this model, the dynamics operate such that the population moves over time as a function of payoffs, and proportions based on the replicator-mutator dynamic multiplied its network density ( Figure 5 ).
Cooperator C n.a. Defector D n.a. Loner L n.a. In Figure 5 , the exploration of the individual indicates its significance sensitivity, according to the exploratory trait of the mutation rate ( Figure 5, left and right) . However, the designated network density, as the individuals' social ties, can mediate its sensitivity. This means that when network density is high enough against the exploratory mutation rate, individuals are sensitized by mutation ( Figure 5 , center-upper panels) but the network density low, the phase portraits are not sufficient to be sensitive to changes in the mutation rate ( Figure 5 , center-bottom panels).
This phenomenon of systemic sensitivity to external influence produces a more interesting evolutionary pattern.
Model application
This proposed model for a public goods game represents a highly nonlinear system of replicator equations that can be analyzed with purely analytical means. For large incentive (r > 2), stable oscillations are observed, but where the cost for participation is too high (g > 1), no one will participate (Sigmund, 2010) . From this, various combinations of time averages of the frequencies and payoffs of three strategies follow. It is found to be impossible to increase cooperation by increasing participation costs (or decreasing incentive), which favors defections and loners (Li, Jusup, Wang, Li, Shi, Podobnik., ... & Boccaletti, 2018) . To promote cooperation, the incentive should be increased or he participation costs decreased, which would favor cooperation in the significant interest rate as well as in the experimental results (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007) .
The simulation in the present model finds that the dynamics exhibit a wide variety of adaptive mechanisms that correspond to many different types of combinations, leading to various oscillations in the frequencies of the three strategies. The option to drop out of these dynamics depends on the mutation rate multiplied by network density as a social influence. In many societies, similar situations may occur, where small mutations are known to be a plausible risk in every network system and must have a marginal contribution to jeopardising the entire system (Helbing, 2013) . Additional incentives attract larger participatory groups, but growth may inherently spell decline through mutations in any circumstance. However, the average effect of an individual's payoff remains the same, depending on the network characteristics, as if the possibility exists in this simulation, in relation to their social ties.
We investigated how the cooperation and defection changes with network characteristics with the involvement of the overall social heterogeneity (Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008) . For small ties among individuals, the heterogeneity remains low because the players only react slowly to social influence. On the other hand, as relationships grow, the dynamics develop rapidly enough to promote the social trap of defection (or free riding). Greater cooperation turns becomes additional competition at sites, which leads to a reduction in the overall network heterogeneity,
given the results shown in this simulation. Reflection of the increase in heterogeneity of the pattern depends on the underlying societal organisation; much interaction is unable to eliminate the common trap and is not quickly eliminated by cooperators (Axelrod, 1986) . Thus, the
